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RE-EXAMINATION OF COMPETITION
bility of abuse exists in the workings of the former practices, but whether
the artificial compromise developed as a curative will relieve or only aggravate
the evils inherent in the distribution system can be known only after the new
procedures have had a fair trial. It may be that the "blocks of five" and
"trade showing" will have to be abandoned, and new procedures devised in
the light of future experience.
A RE-EXAMINATION OF COMPETITION IN GAS
AND ELECTRIC UTILITIES
MONOPOLY is unquestionably the prevailing mode of utility operation. Its
extensive use, however, has not always been accompanied by widespread
popularity among consumers of gas and electricity. Perennial agitation for
municipal ownership and for better regulation is indicative of the weaknesses
in the current utility order. Usually the dissatisfied customer who seeks better
service at lower rates is individually incapable of exerting effective pressure
for reform. Hence, the consumer must rely in large measure on the wisdom,
vigilance, and power of the state regulatory commissions. It is extremely
important, therefore, that the commissions utilize every weapon in their regu-
latory arsenals to improve the condition of the consumers. One of these
weapons which may under certain circumstances be a constructive and friendly
ally of regulation is competition between utilities. In fact, prior to the turn
of the century, there was scarcely a city in the country which did not permit
competition as a device of control.1 But today the great majority of com-
missions use their statutory powers to prevent the existence of competition.
This hostile attitude toward competition dates back approximately to 1900
when monopoly was supplanting competition in public utilities. Once aware
of the justification and reasons for shifting from competition to monopoly,
one can determine whether the events of the last thirty years have altered
the force of those reasons. Furthermore, if the justification for monopoly is
still sound in theory but has failed in practice, alternative methods of operation
deserve greater attention.
The major support for originally changing to monopoly was found in three
primary sources. First, competition was too costly. What began as rivalry
and spirited competition was frequently transformed into the cut-throat variety.
This led to financial exhaustion of weaker competitors which, in turn, resulted
in consolidations or agreements as to rates or territory. The public paid for
this evanescent competition in high rates, attendant upon large rate bases,
inflated mergers, and watered stock.2 Unfortunately, only slight relief could
1. BErInG, CommrrmoN AND MONOPOLY IN PUBLIC UTILITY INDusmIES (1938) 19.
2. Id. at 20.
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be obtained from the static, discontinuous control of utilities by charters and
franchises.3 Secondly, a superior type of regulatory mechanism made its ap-
pearance about 1905 in the form of state utility commissions.4 The existence
of the commission as a regulator and guardian of the interest of the con-
sumer provided a basis for the public to sanction monopoly in utilities although
competition was generally preferred in American industry.5
In the third place, monopoly was said to have intrinsic superiority as com-
pared with the destructive effects of competition. An engineering advantage
arises from the nature of the physical plant and equipment. Since there is a
marked predominance of fixed over variable costs in utility operation, a ten-
dency exists for unit cost to decrease as the amount of business increases.0
By reason of the economies of large scale production, it may be said that the
greater the density of service within a compact area, the more economical the
distribution.7 Then, too, since not all consumers use the service for the same
purpose, their time of use will not exactly coincide, and consequently a greater
quantity of service can be rendered with a given amount of production and
distribution capacity. 8 The above three principles, known in utility jargon
as decreasing cost, density factor, and diversity factor, all underline the im-
portance of serving the largest possible number of users. Conversely, these
enumerated benefits of monopoly tend to disappear when competition divides
the consumers into two groups. Furthermore, if one distribution system is
sufficient, a second constitutes an economic waste insofar as there is dupli-
cation of facilities.
9
Fortified not only by these theoretical advantages, but also with a fresh
recollection of the excesses of competition and its aftermath, the utilities have
led the country to take regulated private monopoly for granted. Economists10
as well as utility executives" have said that people must realize that enter-
prises supplying gas and electricity are "inherently" or "naturally" monop-
olistic. Since these monopolies are "natural," and since nature is beneficent,
3. JONES AND BIGHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITIES (1931) 102 e scq. WILSON,
HERRING AND EUTSLER, PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1938) 26.
4. MOSHER AN!D CRAWFORD, PUBLIC UTILnY REGULATION (1933) 20-26.
5. BONBRIGHT, PUBLIC UTILITIES AND THE NATIONAL POWER POLICIES (1940) 4-8.
6. BEHLING, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 29. Recent cost studies indicate that the de-
creasing cost principle has less validity in railroads than was formerly assumed. See
HEALY, THE EcoNo-mIcs OF TRANSPORTATION I, AmEIUCA (1940) 192-198, Moreover,
economic monopoly does not insure generating units of optimum size.
7. BEHLING, op. cit. supra note 1, at 30.
8. Id. at 32. See Mortenson, Legal Possibilities and Limitations of Milk Distribu-
tion as a Public Utility (1939) 15 J. LAND & P. U. ECON. 438.
9. Myers, Competition in the Public Utility Industry (1926) 45 J. ELECT. 310.
10. BROWN, THE GAS LIGHT COMIPANY OF BALTIMORE-A STUDY Or NATURAL MO-
NOPOLY (1936) 63; JONES AND BIGHAM, Op. cit. supra note 3, at 67 ("inevitable con-
clusion").
11. Insull, The Necessity for Monopolistic Nature of Public Utilities (1923) 10 N. E.
L. A. BULL. 707.
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the inference is that they are "good" monopolies.'- Any conflict of interest
between the private monopoly and the public, it is argued, should be recon-
ciled by regulatory commissions.' 3
While many have been resigned to the notion of "natural monopoly," the
sanctity of the concept has not gone unchallenged. In fact, during the past
thirty years there have been at least 120 reported cases in which the desir-
ability of competition in gas and electricity has been in issue before a state
commission. Only recently the Arkansas Commission allowed one private
natural gas company to invade the territory of another.14 The decision re-
ceived general public approval 15 and had the effect of forcing down rat-
throughout the state.16 Since the fifteen year old natural gas industry, valued
at $3,000,000,000, has not reached the boundaries of its expansion,lr it is
likely that the question of competition will continue to arise. Likewise, the
issue will be debated in the electric light and power industry which is also
still expanding. In electricity, cities like Cleveland and St. Louis' s have not
found competition unacceptable. In Seattle, consumers have a choice of two
electrical services, yet the theoretical wastes of duplication have not prevented
their rates from being at least as low as any city of comparable size.
Protest against private monopoly has also been manifested by the intro-
duction of government ownership. But those who look to public ownership
as the means of obtaining better service at lower rates may be reminded that
gas utilities are still almost completely private'0 and that only about seven
per cent of our electricity is publicly furnished.2 0 Whoever is impatient with
the slow increase in public ownership, or whoever dislikes government owner-
12. Gray, The Passing of the Public Utility Concept (1940) 16 J. Lo & P. U.
EcoN. 8.
13. Myers, loc. cit. supra note 9.
14. Louisiana Nevada Transit Co., 32 P. U. R. (.Nz.s.) 219 (Ark. 1939), aff'd, 142
S. W. (2d) 1940 (Ark. 1940). Hereafter, unless the contrary is indicated, a citation to
the Public Utility Reports will mean a decision of the state utility commission. For the
decision of the Federal Power Commission in this case, see 30 P. U. R. (:..s.) 40 (1939).
15. Communication to the YALE LAw JouRNAL from the Arkansas Department oi
Public Utilities, Nov. 13, 1940.
16. Note (1940) 26 P. U. FoRT. 179.
17. Hearings before Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce on H. R. 11662, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1933) 48; Natural Gas (August, 1940) 22
FoRTUxnE 56.
18. State ex rel. Union Elec. Light & Power Co. v. Public Service Comm., 333 Mo.
426, 62 S. NV. (2d) 742 (1933). In this case the state supreme court handed down a
well-reasoned opinion in support of preserving regulated competition in St. Louis. Also
see Union Electric Light & Power Co., P. U. R. 1932E 402 (Mo.).
19. Bauer, Public Ownership of Public Utilities in the U. S. (1939) 201 An;.A.s 0.
20. Ibid. 11r. Wendell Willlde expressed the belief that public ownership would not
supplant private utilities. If it would occur, however, it would be about twenty years in
the future. See Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Tennessee Valley Authority
on P. R. 83, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1939) 4350.
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ship but is dissatisfied with private monopoly, may at least consider an unduly
neglected 21 alternative - regulated competition.
The new foundations of regulated competition are enmeshed in a re-exam-
ination of the hallowed theory of "natural" monopoly. It is believed that the
assumptions under which private monopoly would succeed have often col-
lapsed. Yet, concurrently, a new basis for competition has been established
which not only avoids most of the early competitive pitfalls in utility opera-
tion, but also offers the well-known advantages of competition. Support for
these generalizations can be found in a critical study of the current utility
scene.
In surveying the present system few will deny that the keystone in the
arch of regulated monopoly has always been the state commission. In spite
of all the theoretical benefits of monopoly, it has been a popular and settled
conviction that private monopoly could only be reconciled with the public
interest by the alchemy of public regulation.22 Yet, at the outset, the role
of the commission was made almost entirely negative; its interference was
largely confined to preventing excessive charges and patent discriminations.
2
Coupled with this negativistic philosophy of control are at least three major
reasons why commission regulation is inadequate. In the first place, insuffi-
ciency of authority is a common ailment. For example, in five states, the
public service commissions have no jurisdiction over gas and electric utilities.
24
The Uniform Public Utilities Act, providing for more stringent regulation,2 5
is still far from general adoption although some progress in strengthening the
commissions has been made in the last ten years.20 Secondly, all the necessary
legislative power may not result in increased effectiveness, if the personnel
of the commissions is utility-minded and politically influenced. Moreover,
since commissioners generally receive low salaries and are subject to rapid
21. Hall, Regulation of Public Utilities (1939) 206 ANNALS 92, 94. In discussing
the various methods of dealing with utilities there is no suggestion of competition as an
aid to regulation.
22. "To allow the great monopoly industries to remain without control in private
hands is to allow an imperium in imnpero-nothing less than a plutocracy." 2 TAussIG,
PRINCIPLES OF EcoNomics (3d ed. 1921) 433. Also see Gray, loc. cit. supra note 12.
Patents are probably the only important exclusive monopolies which are not directly
regulated.
23. The traditional policy of negative restraint is strikingly emphasized by a recently
compiled list of what the public utilities are not forced to do for the positive promotion
of public welfare. See Gray, supra note 12, at 16. Also see statement of Mr. Jerome Frank
in Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee o; P. R. 113, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 1954.
24. WELCH, CASES oN¢ PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (2d ed. 1940 Supp.) 120;
Mosher, Defects of State Regulation of Public Utilities in the U. S. (1939) 201 ANNALS
105.
25. WILSON, HEmING AND EuTsLXa, op. cit. supra note 3, at 52.
26. Bacharach, The Powers of State Utility Commissions (1940) 26 P. U. FOlT.




turnover, the quality and continuity of regulation is seriously impaired. - The
lure of permanent positions with private utilities is likewise a frequent deter-
rent to effective enforcement. Finally, it has been said that not a single com-
mission is adequately financed to carry on the broad range of duties prescribed
in the law.28 When the total annual appropriation for forty-seven commissions
is only $7,113,851 with $2,147,771 of the total spent by three states, :3 it
should occasion no surprise that investigations are infrequent and that regu-
lation is spasmodic. In fact, complicated rate structures, insufficient cost data,
and the "fair value" quandary would tax any commission personnel even
assuming a generous legislature.30 Therefore, in view of these serious defi-
ciencies in commission regulation, competition should not be summarily
dismissed. It may be that regulated competition will create an incentive for
better utility operation which no commission, however attentive, can hope
to supply.
3 1
In addition to the general breakdown of regulation, there are more affir-
mative reasons for allowing competition. Paradoxical as it may seem, it is
nonetheless true that the commissions are now frequently in a position to
eliminate many of the old objections to competition which arose out of the
pre-commission excesses. One of these was the fear of rate wars and ruinous
competition. But this fear should subside now that the Supreme Court has
made it clear that the commissions can constitutionally fix minimum as well
as maximum rates. 32 A second objection was that low rates growing out of
competition boomerang when eventual consolidation produces a doubly large
rate base and hence high rates.33 This argument has lost much of its force,
however, now that thirty-seven states have varying degrees of control over
consolidations and mergers,34 implemented in thirty-three states by statutory
authority over capitalization and issue of securities.m In addition, both the
27. BEHLING, op. cit. supra note 1, at 165; WIrson, HERRtNr ANm EuisiMn, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 63; Mosher, loc. cit. supra note 24.
28. Mosher, loc. cit. supra note 24.
29. Ibid. Compare 2 LyoT, ABRAmSoN AND AssocaTEs, Gov A ms;T AND EcoNoMt-
ic LiFE (1939) 660f.
30. Justices of the Supreme Court have referred to the inadequacy of state regula-
tion. See McCart v. Indianapolis Water Co., 302 U. S. 419, 435 (1938); St. Joseph
Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 88 (1936).
31. Lake, Competition in the Public Utility Fields (1938) 10 Miss. L J. 197.
32. Public Serv. Comm. v. Great Northern Util. Co., 289 U. S. 130 (1933) (private
competition); City of Seymour v. Texas Elect. Serv. Co., 66 F. (2d) 814 (C. C. A.
5th, 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 685 (1933) (municipal competition). For conscious
recognition of the change which. regulation has effected see Idaho L. & P. Co., P. U. R.
1915A 2(Idaho). See also Lake, loc. cit. supra note 31.
33. Gray, L. L, Public Utility Competition: A Case Study (1939) 15 J. LAD &
P. U. ECON. 195.
34. MOODY's PUBuc UTIUTIEs (1939) a 90 (Bonbright Utility Regulation Chart).
35. Ibid. Also see WNisoN, HEII nuG AND EuTsLER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 229;
BAR-xEs, PuBLc UTiLITr Co roL In MASSACHUSETTS (1930) 20.
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Federal Power Commission 36 and the Securities and Exchange Commission8 7
provide a potent regulatory restraint. Furthermore, the history of utility
regulation suggests that it is easier for a commission to check the abuses of
competition than to impose positive duties on a private monopoly.18
Further objections to the use of competition can be met by a consideration
of the diverse forms which competition assumes. Critics of competition and
commissions have sometimes failed to examine the extent and nature of the
competition at issue.39 In the main, the concept can be broken down into
three varieties,40 which sometime overlap: competition of duplication, area,
and displacement. In the first type, the consumer has a choice of buying his
gas or electric service from one of two companies. 41 Irrespective of the con-
sequent wastes of duplication, the consumer may nevertheless fare better than
under regulated monopoly; a fortiori, to the extent that there is competition
without duplication, the result may be more satisfactory. Even under side-
by-side competition the market may be divided so that a competing company
will not need the exact same facilities for generation and distribution as if
it were a monopoly.
Area competition, by contrast, involves the sharing of a territory between
two or more companies. 42 While it destroys the monopoly position of the
original company as to the total area, it may not involve any duplication of
facilities. It is a kind of competition which threatens the existing company
with a restriction of its possible marketing area. Once a given market terri-
tory has been divided between two companies, consumers have a yardstick at
hand by which to compare their rates with those prevailing nearby. If an
area is not completely served, or if only partial duplication will result, it is
questionable if the supposed benefits of integration would offset the advantages
of yardstick competition. The third class constitutes a hybrid, for the com-
petition of displacement gives the existing company the option of selling its
36. The Federal Power Act, 49 STAT. 863, 16 U. S. C. § 791 (Supp. 1939) (Parts II
and III).
37. Public Utility Holding Company Act, 49 STAT. 838 (1935), 15 U. S. C. § 79
(Supp. 1939). See Central Illinois E. & G. Co., Holding Company Act Release No.
1592, June 21, 1939, p. 16; Public Service Co. of Colorado, Holding Company Act Re-
lease No. 1701, Aug. 28, 1939, p. 61.
38. Gray, loc. cit. supra note 12.
39. Hyneman, Public Encouragement of Monopoly in the Utility Industries (1930)
147 ANNALS 160.
40. There is a fourth kind of direct competition in which the consumer instead of a
public utility furnishes its own electricity. In this type of competition, commission inter-
vention is the exception. But see Spingler Electric Corp., P. U. R. 1933D 493 (N. Y.).
For discussion see BEHLING, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 96.
41. Wichita Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm., 132 Kan. 459, 295 Pac, 668 (1931);
Municipal Gas Co., P. U. R. 1928D 418 (Okla.); Re Eyer, P. U. R. 1926A 140 (Mo.).
42. Central Maine Power Co., P. U. R. 1932C 157 (Me.); St. Lawrence Trans-
mission Co., P. U. R. 1921A 577 (N. Y.). See Hoover, A Utility's Right to Protection
from Improper Competition (1930) 5 P. U. FoRT. 346.
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assets to the applicant at a fair value or remaining in business and accepting
competition with another utility.43 If the former occurs there is obviously
no duplication; if the latter, the situation is the same as the first type. Recog-
nition that there are at least three distinct classes of direct competition should
warrant revision in those blanket generalizations which unalterably condemn
competition.
Finally, those opposed to competition must take heed of the ability of a
competitor to offer cheaper services because of lower cost conditions. Ordi-
narily the commission allows at least a stated return on the investment;4
but one of the most unfortunate features of regulated monopoly is that the
utility has no special incentive to lower its costs.45 By contrast, one of the
outstanding merits of competition is that it normally constitutes an automatic
spur to reduce costs. Where extraordinary cost disparities exist, competi-
tion may be even more imperative than usual. For example, because of cost
differences manufactured gas is often no match for natural gas.40 Likewise,
a natural gas system can hardly ever be free from the hazards of competition
arising from the discovery of new sources of supply closer to the final mar-
ket.47 Similarly, in electricity a comparable situation appears where steam
generated power resists the advent of cheaper hydro-electric power.4 8 There-
fore, it is apparent that to prevent competition, where extreme difference
in cost exists, is to inflict an undue penalty on the consumers.
But to some, the above analysis entirely misrepresents the utilities. They
are not monopolies, it is repeatedly urged, but instead are rigorously com-
petitive because of the pervasiveness of substitutions of similar services.40
Since electricity is sold under predominantly competitive conditions, it is
alleged that any profits are competitive profits °0 Admittedfy, substitution is
active in some industrial power and heating, but a large proportion of utility
revenue comes from consumers who have little or no choice, such as domestic
users of electricity.51 Hence it is inaccurate to speak of competitive profits.
Moreover, because the market is part competitive and part monopolistic,
43. Re Call, P. U. R. 1932D 387 (Wyo.) ; Re Brookville, P. U. R. 1929D 483 (Pa.);
Green L. & P. Co., P. U. R. 1920F 980 (Mo.); cf. Truckee River Power Co., P. U. R.
1928E 83 (Cal.) ; Farmers E. & P. Co., P. U. R. 1920D 214 (Cok.).
44. Wn.soN', HERRrNG AND EuTsLR, op. cit. supra note 3, at 154 et seq.
45. It is well to bear in mind the limitations on decreasing costs and the opportunities
for padding costs; the latter are especially aided by the maze of intercorporate relation-
ships. See BEHLiNG, op. cit. supra note 1, at 33-49.
46. Santa faria Gas & Power Co., 9 Cal. R. C. R. 514 (1916); People's Natural
Gas Co., P. U. R. 1915C 696 (Pa.).
47. Louisiana Nevada Transit Co., 32 P. U. R. (N.s.) 219 (Ark. 1939).
48. See Hearings, supra note 20, at 3834.
49. Le Boeuf, When a Monopoly is Not a Monopoly (1930) 6 P. U. Fow. 707;
Cabot, Public Utility Rate Regulation (1929) 7 H,%v. Brs. RE%. 257, 415.
50. Ibid.
51. Gray, Competition as a Basis for Electric Light and Power Rates (1S29) 5 J.
LAND & P. U. Ecox. 242.
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effective regulation is all the more important to protect domestic users from
discriminatory rates charged to subsidize industrial usersY2 Furthermore,
inter-utility competition is seriously curtailed by the expense and inconve-
nience to consumers of changing sources of heat or powerY3 Nor is it easy
to dodge the stifling effects on competition between gas and electricity, as a
result of interrelated control exemplified by the fact that forty per cent of
the revenue of the manufactured gas industry is received by companies which
are operated in conjunction with electrical utilities.
5 4
Equally as important as competitive elements in natural monopoly are the
monopolistic features of the suggested competition. In the economists' lan-
guage, two utilities serving the same market do not represent pure compe-
tition, but regulated duopoly. And under duopoly, it is said, each independent
seller has nothing to gain by cutting rates because the other seller will follow
suit. Since the result of a cut by .either one will decrease his own profits,
no one will reduce rates and the result is the same as if there were a mono-
polistic agreement between them." These conclusions are, however, neither
inviolate nor inevitable. For one thing, the consumer enjoys a substantial
reduction in rates at the outset because a commission will require it as a
prerequisite to the entrance of another company.5 0 In addition to the initial
price cut of the entering utility, the elasticity of demand for gas or electricity,57
often overlooked, makes possible an increase in revenue for both companies
in spite of a rate reduction. Furthermore, a time lag in the lowering of rates
and differentiation in service point away from monopolistic results. Finally,
the vigorous utility competition in the past, and the fact that competition
reduced railroad rates below the regulated maximums gives assurance that
competition will °not stagnate.58
But before duopoly can yield any benefits, usually its very existence must
first receive the legal sanction of the state commission. That sanction is
embodied in the administrative technique known as the "certificate of con-
venience and necessity." It is the indispensable passport which must be
52. BEHLING, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 140.
53. Boatwright, Competition and Electric Rates (1931) 7 J. LAND & P. U. ECON.
181.
54. BEHLING, op. cit. supra note 1, at 132; Bullard, Let There Be Free Competition
(1938) 21 P. U. FORT. 143. The survival of this composite control is seriously threatened
by a recent decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission in which it was held
that, except for statutory exceptions, gas and electric properties cannot constitute one
integrated system under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. See Columbia
G. & E. Corp., Holding Company Act Release No. 2477, Jan. 10, 1941.
55. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (4th ed. 1939) 48.
56. See cases cited infra note 107.
57. Barnes, Temporary Rates in Utility Regulation (1939) 34 ILL. L. REv. 929.
58. LocimN, EcoNoMIcs OF TRANSPORTATION (rev. ed. 1938) 306, 492. Independence
of action is made more certain where one competitor is governmentally owned. See cases




obtained to gain admission into the previously monopolized territory of another
utility.59 The certificate, then, is the objective means of translating the econ-
omic arguments for or against regulated competition into practice. Conse-
quently, the function of the commission in granting or denying a certificate
to a competitor assumes the utmost importance to consumers, utilities, in-
vestors, and the general public.
While the power to grant certificates is not found in each state, the scope
is sufficiently broad enough to be of primary significance. In at least thirty-
three states, containing over two-thirds of the total population, the legislatures
compel prospective competitors in gas and electricity to obtain a certificate
of convenience and necessity from the state commission.00 And the Natural
Gas Act of 1938 endows the Federal Power Commission with similar powers
over competition in the interstate transportation of natural gas.",
A knowledge of the potentialities of a certificate is a prerequisite to its
effective use. The cases do not generally reflect a realization that a certificate
is an extremely flexible method of regulation. - It has been said that a
certificate is in the nature of a mere license which can be amended or re-
voked.es In fact, a commission can impose conditions at the time of granting
a certificate, such as restricting the extent of competition.0 Or since the
administrative body is not usually bound by res judicata, it may subsequently
limit the degree of duplication.65 Moreover, the Supreme Court has made it
quite clear that a certificate to an existing utility is no insurance against
competition. 6
Inasmuch as the words "convenience and necessity" are the only standard
to which the regulatory body must adhere,67 the state commission is also
59. The certificate is also the customary prerequisite to operate where there is no
problem of competition.
60. looDy's, op. cit. supra note 34. This certificate authority does not always apply
to municipal plants.
61. 52 STAT. 833 (1938), 15 U. S. C. § 717 (Supp. 1939). See Kansas Pipe Line and
Gas Co., 30 P. U. P. (N.s.) 321 (F. P. C. 1939). See also Gerkin, The Federal Pmer
Commission and the Gas Industry (1939) 150 AM. GAS J. 9.
62. Unfortunately, the commission decisions, with some exceptions, reveal an ignor-
ance of the policy of other states and a rather blind adherence to the judicial principle
of stare decisis. See Hyneman, The Case Law of the New Yorh Public Seruice Coam-
inission (1934) 34 CoL L. Ray. 67, 73.
63. BEHiaNG, op. cit. mipra note 1, at 62; Hall, Cerlificales of Conveni ence and Neces-
sity (1929) 28 MicH. L. REv. 107, 276.
64. South Coast Gas Co., P. U. I- 1929E 476 (Calif.). But see Arkansas Valley
Natural Gas Co., P. U. K. 1931A 415 (Colo.).
65. Vallejo E. L. & P. Co., P. U. RK 1923A 1 (Calif.).
66. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth'y, 306 U. S. 118 (1939):
Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U. S. 464 (1938).
67. There is general agreement that the courts ordinarily will not substitute their
judgment for that of the administrative bodies. Federal Communic. Comm. Y. Pottsville
Broadcasting Co., 308 U. S. 422 (1939); Kansas G. & E. Co. v. Public Service Comm.,
122 Kan. 462, 251 Pac. 1097 (1927).
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endowed with a wide range of freedom to allow or prevent competition. Rare
is the statute which even suggests a definition of these key words. 8 Certainly,
"necessity" is not used in its lexicographical sense to mean "indispensable" ;09
if it were, no certificate would ever be granted. Rather, the total expression
is a vague term of art. Insofar as any over-all theory has been enunciated,
it has been held that the primary concern of the commission is the public
convenience and need, that the interests of the existing company are secondary,
and that the desires and solicitations of the applicant are a relatively minor
consideration.7" Or it has been stated that there must be a gain to the public
welfare large enough to compensate for the loss involved in duplication or
displacement of facilities. 71 To ascertain, however, whether a net gain will
ensue from competition of whatever variety, the commission invariably leaves
the highly abstract level of "convenience and necessity" and buckles down
to a comparison of the utilities in question.
But in making comparisons, the majority of the state commissions place
the particular facts over against an interpretation of the statute, which favors
monopoly at almost any price.72 Although the state statutes were designed
to prevent promiscuous competition, they explicitly provided for the entrance
of new companies. In practice, the latitude of discretion given the commis-
sions has led to the formulation of major policy by administrative officials
instead of by the legislatures. So sharp are the contrasts among states in
permitting or denying competition under similar laws that the legislatures
may desire more concrete statutes in the future, or present commissioners,
not tied by stare decisis, may reverse past commission policy. 73
Measured by the policy pursued, the state commissions tend to fall into
two groups. California leads those which are liberal in allowing competition
while New York and Wisconsin are in the forefront of those who make com-
petition the last resort. In 1912, the California Commission frankly admitted
its inability to achieve the benefits of competition and saw in the latter a
powerful ally of regulation.74 With admirable foresight it realized that the
incentive to compete would suffer an almost fatal blow if an existing com-
pany. could rest secure until a competitor appeared, and then avoid com-
petition by matching the proffered advantages of the applicant. Therefore,
contrary to the policy of other states, an existing company was not given a
day of repentance, but was compared with the applicant as of the date of
68. For exceptions see Natural Gas Act, 52 SrAT. 833 (1938), 15 U. S. C. § 717
(Supp. 1939); MIcH. STAT. ANN. (1937) §§22, 145.
69. Wabash C. & W. Ry. v. Commerce Comm., 309 Ill. 412, 141 N. E. 212 (1923).
70. Kansas G. & E. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 122 Kan. 462, 251 Pac. 1097 (1927).
71. BEHLING, op. cit. supra note 1, at 62.
72. Hall, supra note 63, at 283.
73. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm., 127 Pa. Super. 11, 191 Ati.
678 (1937); Borough of Myerstown, 12 P. U. R. (N.s.) 39 (Pa. 1939).
74. Pacific G. & E. Co., 1 Cal. R. C. R. 203 (1912).
[Vol. SO: 875
RE-EXAMINATION OF COMPETITION
the application to compete.7r If this traditionally liberal policy of California
now shows signs of weakening,76 it may be partially justified, at least as to
duplicatory competition, by reason of the comparative efficiency and exemplary
quality of that state commission. In the larger group of states, the com-
missions tacitly assume their own effectiveness to deal with private monopoly,
and rationalize that a better service can be had in the long run by protecting
the initiative of the pioneers in the field.77 This reasoning has not been literally
followed, however, where area competition was at stake; in such instances,
the first company in the area was not allowed to retain a monopoly if it failed
to develop part of its original grant of territory.18
Once a state commission has decided to allow competition either as a
general policy or in a restricted manner, it relies on a number of specific
factors to determine each individual application for a certificate. These in-
dude service, rates, potential demand, investment, financial strength, and
public opinion.79 Fundamental to a decision to permit or restrict competition
is the adequacy of service. Naturally, where the existing service is satis-
factory, the applicant must show defects in other respects to be successful.89
By the same token, poor service sows the seeds of competition,8 ' but not
invariably.8 2 The strains of national defense priorities83 or of company
reconstruction, 4 for example, may be a valid excuse for inferior service.
On the other hand, it is not always enough to render efficient and cheap
75. Pacific G. & E. Co., 1 Cal. R. C. R. 203 (1912); Oro Electric Corp., 2 Cal.
R. C. R. 748 (1913); Pacific G. & E. Co., P. U. R. 1922B 495 (Calif.); Truckee River
Power Co., P. U. R. 1928E 83 (Calif.). Followed in other states: Idaho L. & P. Co.,
P. U. R. 1915A 2 (Idaho); Farmers E. & P. Co., P. U. R. 1920D 214 (Colo.).
76. Western Natural Gas Co., P. U. R. 1930A 307 (Calif.). Communication to the
YALE LAW JOuRNAL from the California Commission, Dec. 4, 1940.
77. Illinois P. & L. Corp. v. Commerce Comm., 320 Ill. 427, 151 N. E. 235 (1926);
Central Maine Power Co., P. U. R. 1930A 513 (Me.); Carey Electric & Milling Co.,
P. U. R. 1926D 804 (Wis.); Lawrence Park H. L. & P. Co., P. U. IL 1926B 111, 125
(N. Y.); Re Vineland, P. U. R 1926D 723 (N. J.); Re Tootell, P. U. L 1927A 155
(N. H.).
78. Nassau & Suffolk Lighting Co., P. U. R. 1927A 132 (N. Y.); Central .Maine
Power Co., P. U. R. 1932C 157 (Me.); Colliers L. H. & P. Co., P. U. R. 1916C 212
(N. Y.).
79. The decisions of the Arkansas, California, and Missouri Commissions, as well as
those of the Federal Power Commission, are usually conspicuous by the clarity and com-
pleteness with which these tests are applied.
80. Jackson County L. H. & P. Co., 16 P. U. IL (N.s.) 244 (Mo. 1936); Municipal
Gas Co., P. U. R. 1928D 418 (Okla.); Independence Natural Gas Co., P. U. IL 1923D
433 (Mo.).
81. Re Call, P. U. R. 1932D 387 (VWyo.); Raytown Chamber of Commerce, 17 Mo.
P. S. C. R. 601 (1929); Truckee River Power Co., P. U. R. 1928E 83 (Calif.); Re
Eyer, P. U. R. 1926A 140 (Mo.).
82. Re Brookville, P. U. R. 1929D 483 (Pa.); Midvalley Power Co., P. U. IL 1916A
959 (Pa.).
83. Glen Mills Electric Co., P. U. IL 1920B 797 (Pa.).
84. Oro Electric Corp., 2 Cal. IL C. IL 748 (1913).
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service to those already being served; for a utility is also judged by the
way it tries to serve those who are not yet customers.80 Thus, a premium
is placed on willingness 0 and promptness8 7 to serve as well as on the physical
ability to render service. The fact that the commission could compel service
through time-consuming legal processes does not prevent the regulatory body
from employing competition as the remedy, especially where the utility has
a reputation for being exhaustingly litigious.88 Where there is an emergency,
speed is even more essential.8 9
The commission, however, does not concentrate exclusively on the exist-
ing company, but constantly compares it with the applicant's capacity to
furnish good service. If the newcomer can render adequate service much
more economically because of geographical advantages, the competition may
be allowed, but only so long as it does not result in skimming the cream
of consumers.90 In estimating the reliability of the applicant's claims, the
promises may be evaluated in the light of past performances in other local-
ities. 91
Other significant problems of service arise which are peculiar to natural
gas. As the commission looks to the supply of water of a hydro-electric power
company, 92 so must it likewise check on the presence9 3 or absence0 4 of ade-
quate gas reserves of a natural gas company seeking to compete with a similar
gas or with the manufactured product. Doubt as to the newcomer's supply
of gas has been resolved in his favor on the theory that competitive-minded
citizens should bear the responsibility of a possible future cessation in service.
Once the basic source is assured, the safety of the gas must also be ap-
proved. 90 Then, too, the size of the pipe line and the pressure within it must
85. Wichita Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm., 132 Kan. 459, 295 Pac. 668 (1931);
Pacific G. & E., P. U. R. 1922B 495 (Calif.).
86. Municipal L. & P. Co., 12 P. U. R. (N.s.) 103 (Ark. 1935); Gas Fuel Service
Co., 3 P. U. R. (N.s.) 55 (Calif. 1933); Coast Counties G. & E. Co., P. U. R. 1917C
709 (Calif.) ; Atlantic City Electric Co., P. U. R. 1928D 407 (N.J.).
87. St. Joseph R. L. H. & P. Co., P. U. R. 1933A 405 (Mo.); Cold Spring L. H.
& P. Co., P. U. R. 1925D 311 (N. Y.).
88. Village of Little Valley, 22 P. U. R. (N.s.) 63 (N. Y. 1938).
89. Re Pinedale, P. U. R. 1932D 96 (Wyo.); Oliver Power Co., P. U. R. 1932C
203 (Colo.).
90. Incorporators of Service Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm., 126 Pa. Super. 381,
190 Atl. 653 (1937); Coast Counties G. & E., P. U. R. 1917C 709 (Calif.); Great West-
ern Power Co., 8 Cal. R. C. R. 426 (1915).
91. Oro Electric Corp., 2 Cal. R. C. R. 748 (1913).
92. Re Call, P. U. R. 1932D 387 (Wyo.).
93. Louisiana Nevada Transit Co., 32 P. U. R. (N.s.) 219 (Ark. 1939); Colorado
Gas & Oil Pipe Line Co., P. U. R. 1925A 499 (Colo.).
94. Incorporators of Service Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm., 126 Pa. Super. 381,
190 Atl. 653 (1937); Jackson County L. H. & P. Co., 16 P. U. R. (N.s.) 244 (Mo.
1936).
95. Municipal Gas Co., P. U. R. 1928D 418 (Okla.).
96. Louisiana Nevada Transit Co., 32 P. U. R. (N.s.) 219 (Ark. 1939).
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satisfy the commission that the peak load can be met."7 A closely related
problem arises out of "shut-off" clauses, whici provide that in case of
shortage, domestic consumers of natural gas take priority over industrial
users. In order to make a long distance pipe line profitable, the low return
on the sale of natural gas to industrials usually necessitates the serving of
domestic consumers. But during the summer, the great drop in cooking and
heating almost forces natural gas companies to sell their product to industry
at dump prices to avoid waste. In view of the seasonal nature of the domestic
demand and the associated problem of storage,08 the commissions have been
more or less hostile to applicants who desired to serve only industrials.",
New methods of liquifying gas may go a long way, however, toward solving
these storage and shut-off problems.'0 0  Or commissions may sidestep the
entire problem by stating that the competing company will provide what
amounts to a new and distinct service.10 1 This technique is also used, with
more justification, in holding that because natural gas generally contains
about twice as many heating units as artificial gas, the former is a much
different service.'
0 2
Although the gas or electric service may be adequate, the stumbling block
to retaining a monopoly may be high rates. 03 When the rates of the old gas
company are so high that other fuels are being widely used, and the con-
sumption decreases as the population of the area increases, then direct com-
petition probably can not be effectively resisted.'0 4 If rates of an extravagant
electric company are higher by thirty or forty per cent than in comparable
communities, competition may be admitted even though the rate of return
on the capital invested is fair. In so holding, the Wisconsin Commission
indicated the value of the competitive threat in protecting consumers from
uneconomical utility expenditures. 0 5 Another opportunity for cost control
through competition occurs when the state lacks jurisdiction over the rates
at which the distributing company purchases for resale."' Usually, excessive
97. Ibid. Kansas Pipe Line & Gas Co., 30 P. U. R. (N.s.) 321 (F. P. C. 1939).
98. Hearings before the Cominittee on Interstate Commerce on S. 1725, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1935) 660.
99. Service Gas Co., 15 P. U. R. (x.s.) 202 (Pa. 1936); Cabot Gas Corp., 16 P. U.
R. (N.s.) 443 (N. Y. 1936); Western Natural Gas Co., P. U. R. 1930A 307 (Calif.).
100. N. Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1941, p. D7, col. 1.
101. Industrial Gas Co., P. U. R. 1929A 516 (Mio.).
102. Lukens Steel Co., 25 P. U. R. (N.s.) 20 (Pa. 1938); People's National Gas Co.,
P. U. R. 1915C 696 (Pa.); Industrial Gas Co., P. U. L 1929A 516 (Mo.). It has been
argued that a difference of 196 B.tu. between two natural gases represents a new service.
Brief for appellants, p. 109, in Louisiana Nevada Transit Co., 142 S. NV. (3d) 213 (Ark.
1940). See also Vincent, Natural Gas in California (1939) 21 AEsacmn GAs Assocm-
TION PROCF.umDGs 61.
103. Louisiana Nevada Transit Co., 32 P. U. P. (ms.) 219 (Ark. 1939). See also
30 P. U. R. (m.s.) 40 (F. P. C. 1939).
104. Municipal Gas Co., P. U. R. 1928D 418 (Okla.).
105. Village of Hustisford, 2 P. U. M. (N.s.) 485 (Wis. 1934).
106. Industrial Gas Co., P. U. P. 1929A 516 (Mo.).
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rates spell the end of exclusive control of the market regardless of claimed
theoretical advantages in operating costs, 0 7 unless the commission grants
time to repent.'08 When rates are too high, it is no excuse for the continuance
of monopoly that consumers might have sought relief by complaint to the
commission. 109 Furthermore, in the comparison of the existent with the
proposed rates, the newcomer must offer more than a mere shading in rates
to be a successful applicant."10 To aid in determining whether the applicant's
rates will remain reasonable in the future, the commission relies not only on
consumers' testimony, but also on an examination of construction contracts
and contracts for supply of the product to be resold."'
To service and rate considerations, the California Commission added the
doctrine of saturation or potential demand." 2 Closely associated with the
previously mentioned categories of competition, this criterion stresses the
advantage of permitting competition in an area where economic expansion
has not ceased. Those customers lost by the old company will be compensated
for by the securing of new business. L3 Furthermore, wherever a new utility
will aid in expanding the economy of the region or will assist in retaining
industry already there, it is a point in its favor.1 4 At the other extreme, the
outcome of competition in a static economy may be mutual bankruptcy, par-
ticularly if it will mean superfluous facilities.";
-Still another consideration is the interest of investors in the existing utility.
In this regard, the commissions have split. On the one hand, it is contended
107. State ex rel. Kansas City P. & L. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 335 Mo. 1248,
76 S. W. (2d) 343 (1934) ; State ex rel. Electric Co. of Missouri v. Atkinson, 275 Mo.
325, 204 S. W. 897 (1918); Industrial Gas Co., P. U. R. 1929A 516 (Mo.); Truckee
River Power Co., P. U. R. 1928E 83 (Calif.); Santa Maria G. & P. Co., 9 Cal. R. C. R.
514 (1916); People's Natural Gas Co., P. U. R. 1915C 696 (Pa.).
108. City of Yuma, 2 P. U. R. (N.s.) 8 (Ariz. 1933) ; see cases cited supra note 77.
109. State ex rel. Kansas City P. & L. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 335 Mo. 248,
76 S. W. (2d) 343 (1934); Western Natural Gas Co., P. U. R. 1930A 307 (Calif.)
(dissent). See Witmer, Consumers' Appeals front Public Service Commission Rate
Orders (1941) 8 U. OF CmS. L. REv. 258.
110. Raytown Chamber of Commerce, 17 Mo. P. S. C. R. 601 (1929) ; Beaver River
P. & L. Co., P. U. R. 1915B 281 (Idaho); Oro Electric Corp., 2 Cal. R. C. R. 748
(1913).
111. Kansas Pipe Line & Gas Co., 30 P. U. R. (N.s.) 321 (F. P. C. 1939); Louisiana
Nevada Transit Co., 32 P. U. R. (r.s.) 219 (Ark. 1939).
112. Pacific G. & E. Co., 1 Cal. R. C. R. 203 (1912) ; see cases cited supra note 75.
113. Louisiana Nevada Transit Co., 32 P. U. R. (N.s.) 219 (Ark. 1939). The Fed-
eral Trade Commission has warned of the danger of underestimating the increased de-
mand for power caused by national defense expansion in industry. The threat of war
itself has magnified the importance of duplication of facilities as a means of preserving
continuity of service under all circumstances. See N. Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1941, p. LIS,
col. 1.
114. Ibid.; Idaho L. & P. Co., P. U. R. 1915A 2 (Idaho).
115. Callicoon Independent Electric Co., P. U. R. 1919C 672 (N. Y.); Midvalley
Power Co., P. U. R. 1916A 959 (Pa.) ; Gray, loc. cit. supra note 38.
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that since the existing utility made expenditures in the belief that it held an
exclusive privilege, the stockholders should be protected regardless of the
inferior service.1 1 G On the other hand, guided by the doctrine that the pro-
tection of the existing utility is incidental to the welfare of the consumers,
some commissions have said that investors undertook the hazard of financial
loss. 117 The California Commission, for instance, has declared that it feels
no obligation to protect the investment of a utility which is not doing its full
duty to the public." s Wisconsin likewise refused to shield investors where
the utility indulged in extravagant expenditures. 10 Of course, investors may
not be materially injured where the competition is restricted, 120 or where the
new company will purchase the old one for a fair valueY'-'
Still another aspect of the position of the investor concerns the securing
of new capital. It is stated that in addition to the possible direct injury to
present security holders, loss of a monopoly position may seriously curtail
the ability of the old company to float new security issues. The common
objection is that competition introduces a new risk of reduced earnings to
the point where it becomes more expensive to attract capital in the future-12
Actually, however, assuming intelligent commission regulations, profits may
not be critically reduced by competition, for the elasticity of demand enables
greater revenue to flow from lower rates. Moreover, it appears that the
sufficient-return-to-attract-capital thesis has been overworked in the case of
public utilities. a3 It is questionable to pursue a policy of investment protec-
tion which may undermine in utilities one of the most creative driving forces
in capitalism - risk-taldngYa 4
The degree of risk assumed by either one of two competitors is likely
to vary with their relative financial strength. But to predict precisely the
results of financial disparity is exceedingly difficult, because both a weak
and a powerful company may pursue price policies designed to enlarge the
risks taken by the other. Although there is some contrary authority,12
it has been generally held that in comparing financial resources the largest
utility is not necessarily entitled to prevent competition from a smaller
116. Re Tootell, P. U: R. 1927A 155 (N. I); Independence Natural Gas Co., P.
U. R. 1923D 433 (fo.); Wilkes-Barre Light Co., P. U. R. 1917C 906 (Pa.).
117. Re Eyer, P. U. R. 1926A 140 (Mo.); Green L & P. Co., 10 Mo. P. S. C. R. 58
(1920).
118. Truckee River Power Co., P. U. R. 1928E 83 (Calif.).
119. Village of Hustisford, 2 P. U. R. (Ns.) 485 (Wis. 1934).
120. Raystown Water Power Co., P. U. R. 1915B 862 (Pa.).
121. Turner L. & P. Co., P. U. R. 1916A 418 (Me.).
122. BEHLING, op. cit. supra note 1, at 42; JoNEs AND BiamAzs, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 93-97.
123. BEHLmG, Op. cit. supra note 1 at 42.
124. 2 FAIRCHILD, FuRNIss AND BucK, ELENIENTARY ECONIOniscs (4th ed. 1939) 195-
201.
125. Re Western Natural Gas Co., P. U. R. 1930A 307 (Calif.).
1941]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
company. 20 Even assuming that a commission has decided what plane of
competition it prefers to promote, the weaknesses of prophesying the future
of rates and service based on comparative financial strength are serious enough
to make a commission doubt its fears of the result. Generally, one who seeks
entry must indicate financial backing commensurate with the undertaking. 127
There is a division of opinion, however, as to whether the specific financial
plan need be approved .'2  Furthermore, where funds are to be obtained from
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, an unconditional certificate will not
be issued until the Government agency has made its separate commitment.12
Another operative factor which the commissions consider is public opinion.
Expressions of a preference for a particular company bear weight;130 and
the regulatory bodies are not indifferent to complaints of consumers and to
poor public relations.' 3 ' On the other hand, absence of complaints against
the rate of the existing company for eight years has not been ignored when
competition threatened.' 3 2 Public opinion, however, also includes the expres-
sion of special pressure groups to keep out competing services. Both natural
gas and hydro-electric power run into bitter opposition from coal, labor, and
railroad interests, especially in the coal producing states.133 But the com-
missions, aware of the dangers of erecting artificial trade barriers,3 4 have
been reluctant to impede the entrance of cheaper services.130 And where the
avowed policy of the state is to prevent wastage of natural gas, competition
has been urged as a means to achieve more complete utilization.13 0
If a revaluation and analysis of utility competition leads to a less automatic
and more reflective consideration of competition, it will be one step in the
direction of improved commission regulation. Naturally, in practice, the
various specific factors will be considered in their totality of relations rather
126. Union Public Service Co. v. Corporation Comm., 140 Kan. 722, 37 P. (2d)
1010 (1934).
127. Kansas Pipe Line & Gas Co., 30 P. U. R. (N.s.) 321 (F. P. C. 1939); Jackson
County L. H. & P. Co., 16 P. U. R. (N.s.) 244 (Mo. 1936); Colorado Gas & Oil Line
Co., P. U. R. 1925A 499 (Colo.).
128. Louisiana Nevada Transit Co., 32 P. U. R. (N.s.) 219 (Ark. 1939); Industrial
Gas Co., P. U. R. 1929A 516 (Mo.).
129. Kansas Pipe Line & Gas Co., 30 P. U. R. (N.s.) 321 (F. P. C. 1939).
130. State ex rel. Kansas City P. & L. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 335 Mo. 1248,
76 S. W. (2d) 343 (1934) ; see cases cited supra note 128.
131. Re Call, P. U. R. 1932D 387 (Wyo.); Municipal Gas Co., P. U. R. 1928D
418 (Okla.); Truckee River Power Co., P. U. R. 1928E 83 (Calif.).
132. Re Western Gas Co., P. U. R. 1930A 307 (Calif.).
133. North Dakota Consumers Gas Co., 30 P. U. R. (w.s.) 9 (N. D. 1939); Kansas
Pipe Line & Gas Co., 30 P. U. R. (N.s.) 321 (F. P. C. 1939); Lukens Steel Co., 25
P. U. R. (N.s.) 20 (Pa. 1938) ; Cabot Gas Corp., 16 P. U. R. (N.s.) 443 (N. Y. 1936);
West Virginia Power & Transmission Co., P. U. R. 1930D 225 (W. Va.).
134. ROGERS, CAPVrALiSm IN Caisis (1938) c. 7.
135. See cases cited supra note 133.
136. Western Gas Co., P. U. R. 1930A 307 (Calif.) (dissent).
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than as abstracted entities. Whether "natural" monopoly is preserved or
competition is admitted will depend largely on the particular facts as well as
on commission policy. Perhaps when state regulation of private monopoly
can more nearly approach the benefits of competition than at present, direct
competition may be superfluous. That day has not yet arrived. In the mean-
time, the best service to the public will be rendered by commissions which,
in passing on the desirability of competition, have the courage and honesty
to include as a "factor" their own strength or impotency in obtaining lower
rates and better service. Unthinking devotion to an early commission holding
in favor of regulated monopoly may not only penalize the consumers of one
area, but the removal of the threat of competition also destroys the powerful
incentive to improvement throughout a state. It is true that competition
may only be a temporary curative pending the future existence of enlightened
utility management, greatly improved commission regulation, or public owner-
ship. But the remoteness of any or all of these potential remedies demands
that serious consideration be accorded regulated competition.
